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Leading international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, have increasingly become a locus of power in the post-cold war global order, even as 
they seek to sustain their self-characterisation as movements that are ‘outside’ those global 
power structures. This development has changed the context within which their activities 
must be understood and evaluated. While they have consciously expanded their frames of 
reference over the past decade to include a broader range of social, economic and cultural 
rights, they have not adequately addressed (perhaps are unable to) the issues of ‘trade-offs’ 
and ‘transitions’ that those working in these spheres are daily confronted with. Indeed, in that 
sphere where their power is most forcefully expressed – international, or ‘global justice’, as 
exemplified by the debates about the international criminal court and universal jurisdiction – 
there appears to be a growing ‘international legal absolutism’ that reflects the increased 
domination of lawyers in decision-making processes.  
 
The consequences of this trend are felt particularly sharply in contexts of ‘internal conflict’, 
where messy and complex local realities appear increasingly subordinated to ‘global justice’ 
agendas. Specific historical and political analysis appears increasingly often to have been 
submerged by these agendas. Questions of how we get ‘from here to there’ over time, and 
regarding ‘imperfect’ strategies, are addressed simplistically, if at all. Beneath the rhetorical 
claims, ‘Justice’ in the context of internal conflicts becomes more and more narrowly defined 
as judicial action at all costs, with international interventions viewed as inherently a good 
thing. Also, their capacity to project these agendas inevitably shapes debate within affected 
countries or regions amongst local or regional NGOs – not in itself invidious, but potentially 
problematic given the asymmetries of power and resources that often exist between these 
ostensible ‘partners’ (or, indeed, between the centre and local chapters). No less importantly, 
these agendas are – for better or for worse – coming increasingly to fill a vacuum left by the 
crisis in ‘non-political humanitarian intervention’ that has developed over the past decade. 
Justice has been increasingly posited as a way of recasting and relegitimising international 
military interventions. This process has gathered pace dramatically since the terrorist attacks 
on the US on 11 September 2001 and the ‘war on terror’ that has ensued. Not for nothing was 
the US-led campaign against ‘terror’ initially called ‘operation infinite justice’.1  
 
This paper reviews the ongoing debates about justice within the international human rights 
movement and the strategies that have flowed from these debates. I begin by briefly 
identifying the changing historical and social bases and accompanying culture-ideologies over 
time of key international players in this drama, and how they have impacted upon the actions 
of governments and multilateral bodies such as the UN. In doing so, I chart the emergence of 
what I call the ‘power of justice/justice as power’ nexus (henceforth abbreviated in the text to 
‘power/justice’) that I believe is now emerging. I also seek to review the impact of this 
                                                
1 Protests from across the Islamic world, for whom only Allah can dispense ‘infinite justice’, led to its renaming 
as ‘operation enduring freedom’.  
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paradigm on humanitarianism and in doing so reflect upon the kind of politics that human 
rights workers can and should seek to adopt. Finally, I refract my arguments through a case 
study of Sierra Leone, where the ‘power/justice’ nexus has heavily shaped efforts to end 
conflict over the past five years. In Sierra Leone, there has been both a Special Court to try 
those with ‘greatest responsibility’ for human rights abuses and an official Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  
 
If it is legitimate and important for international development and humanitarian organisations 
to be subject to critical scrutiny, as they have increasingly been over the past decade, then so 
too is it for the world of international human rights NGOs – particularly now that they are a 
locus of power. So far, there has been remarkably little critical scrutiny of them. For 
understandable reasons, they have not gone out of their way to encourage it themselves.2 But 
if human rights are to be genuinely promoted and strengthened in the coming years, I believe 
that more critical scrutiny (and, perhaps, greater degrees of reflexive humility) is now 
essential. Hopefully, this paper will be a useful contribution to the debate. 
 
 
The emergence of the ‘power/justice’ nexus 
In terms of the wider explosion of international NGOs since 1945, human rights organisations 
represent a ‘second wave’, following on from the first, which was predominantly 
characterised by increasing numbers of international development and humanitarian 
organisations. 1961 saw the birth of Amnesty International (AI), which has become the 
leading international NGO in the human rights field, with over one million members around 
the world. Although the majority of these are in the north, it has a significant southern 
constituency, particularly in Asia and Latin America. AI has always described itself as a 
movement of citizens, and it is certainly the nearest thing there is to a cosmopolitan social 
movement at the global level in the human rights sphere. However, it has always been well-
connected. Its senior echelons have been full of people who had good access to the corridors 
of power, at least in the West.3 But this did not necessarily mean that they had much leverage 
over those who held power. For that to happen, a convergence of interests that was more than 
temporary was necessary. This began to emerge from the mid-1970s, as the need to create a 
more sophisticated strategy to combat communism was acknowledged in the West, one which 
drew more from universal legal instruments protecting human rights than from the 
comparatively amorphous notions of freedom that had prevailed previously. 
 
The establishment of Human Rights Watch (HRW) at that time was a reflection outside the 
government sphere in the US of this important shift. While not a mass membership 
organisation like AI, HRW has progressively expanded over the subsequent decades, 
establishing regional divisions across the globe. Its mandate has traditionally been broader 
than AI’s, explicitly embracing economic, social and cultural rights. But the struggle against 
impunity – the failure by national governments and/or the wider international community to 
bring to justice alleged perpetrators of human rights violations  – has always been central to 
both organisations. 
                                                
2 The academic and wider literature on organisations like Amnesty International ranges from the practically-
oriented (i.e. ‘how it does a – z’) to the semi-hagiographical.  For an example of the latter, see Jonathan Power, 
Like Water on Stone: The Story of Amnesty International, London: Penguin, 2001. One of the few scholarly 
works that addresses the ‘real history’ of the organization is Tom Buchanan’s ‘The Truth will Set you Free: The 
Making of Amnesty International’, Journal of Contemporary History, 37:4 (2002). 
3 For an interesting study of the relationship between AI and the UK Government over the Rhodesia crisis, see T. 
Buchanan, ‘Amnesty International in Crisis, 1966-7’, Twentieth Century British History, 15:3 (2004). 
 3
 
These organisations – and others that progressively emerged in the following years – found 
themselves getting increasingly receptive hearings from Western governments from the mid-
1970s, although this happened mainly when they were criticizing communist countries in 
Eastern Europe, the Caribbean and East Asia. As the environment for radical activism seemed 
to be shrinking in the West, and as disillusionment with the Communist bloc grew, 
organisations such as AI became potential vehicles for achieving political objectives by 
degrees of stealth. The focus for such people became helping to create the space for the 
radical social movements they hoped would emerge or gather strength. At the same time, 
there was a process of professionalisation of human rights activism as organisations looked 
for greater expertise within their ranks. This had many necessary dimensions but, as always, 
carried with it the risk of greater bureaucracy and, in AI’s case, distance between the 
International Secretariat in London and the wider membership. It also increased tendencies 
between organisations – not least between AI and HRW, both of whom obtain the largest part 
of their funds from the US – towards competition and empire-building, at least at senior 
management level.4  
 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism across most of the globe, an 
ideological and discursive vacuum developed. Apparently non-political discourses of 
humanitarianism and human rights have come gradually to fill this vacuum. Although they are 
often partly camouflaged by self-interested actions by powerful states, this does not mean that 
we should dismiss this shift simply as conspiratorial opportunism by the victors of the cold 
war. As Hardt and Negri have argued, a new form of Empire is taking shape. As they write:  
…what used to be conflict or competition among several imperialist powers has 
in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that 
overdetermines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under 
one common notion of right that is decidedly post colonial and postimperialist. 
This is really the point of departure for our study of Empire: a new notion of right, 
or rather, a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of 
norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve 
conflicts.5  
The dramatic expansion of the right of intervention that is flowing from this development is 
underpinned, according to Hardt and Negri, by: 
not just a permanent state of emergency and exception, but a permanent state of 
emergency and exception justified by the appeal to essential values of justice. In 
other words, the right of the police is legitimated by universal values.6 
 
                                                
4 This reflects my experience at AI while working for the organisation during the mid-1990s. 
5 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.9. 
6 Hardt & Negri (2000), p.18. It is worth noting that their reference in the last sentence to the “right of the 
police” directly echoes the language used so positively to justify international intervention by keen advocates of 
global justice such as Mary Kaldor, who has long combined academic research on ‘new wars’ and liberal-
cosmpolitan alternatives with human rights work in central and Eastern Europe. Finally, a key question often 
asked on the left about Hardt and Negri’s new Empire is, ‘who is running it?’. They claim that although the US 
undoubtedly occupies a “privileged position” in the new Empire (pp.xiii-xiv), it does not dominate it in the way 
that individual states did so during previous imperial epochs. This perhaps looks less convincing in the 
immediate aftermath of September 11 2001. Nonetheless, I believe it will prove an accurate analysis in the 
longer-term if the new Empire is to sustain and consolidate itself. It will be unable to do either on any other 
basis. 
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This is the context in which the international human rights movement is increasingly 
operating. Although organisations such as AI and HRW potentially retain the ‘double-edged’ 
character that originally attracted many on the left into them, there is a real danger that they 
will become normalised and incorporated into global structures of power and interest on the 
basis of what have become the ‘official values’ of contemporary global governance. They 
now have unparalleled access to power-holders within Western governments and multilateral 
organisations such as the UN. But their power, while ostensibly greater than it has ever been, 
is still largely dependent upon the selective patronage of powerful Northern governments. 
When these governments do not wish to hear them, there is still little that they can do about 
that. International human rights NGOs persistently complain about the ‘double standards’ that 
endlessly arise in this context. At the same time, the degree of interchange of personnel 
between international human rights organisations and Western governments or multilateral 
organisations has increased enormously, to the point where they often share a common 
culture-ideology. This confluence has helped shape one of the most important “strategic 
complexes” that Duffield has described as central to the emerging structures of global 
governance.7 A further development has been the growing preponderance of lawyers within 
these organisations over other specialists, including those with national or regional 
experience. This preponderance has had the biggest impact in the sphere of global justice. 
Following the collapse of communism, the possibility of pursuing the longstanding objective 
of an international criminal court reasserted itself. This was reflected in the way in which 
‘second best’ strategies of promoting accountability in so-called post-conflict situations like 
truth commissions, which both AI and HRW had taken a relatively positive stance on during 
the 1980s (most notably in the context of so-called peace processes and democratic transitions 
in Latin America), have come to be viewed with much less enthusiasm by both organisations 
during the 1990s and into the new century.8 
 
Even the emergence of ad hoc tribunals, while initially strongly supported by AI and HRW, 
has been viewed with a growing degree of ambivalence by these organisations, embodying 
what they consider to be over-politicised and imperfect justice. A narrow definition of justice 
in primarily legalistic and judicial terms can play into the hands of powerful governments that 
are reluctant to address the root causes of poverty and violent conflict. International human 
rights organisations like AI and HRW have so far been relatively peripheral to wider 
campaigns for social and economic justice within the global order, and have often found it 
difficult to construct genuine partnerships with local NGOs.9 There remain problems of 
accountability and legitimacy in terms of their own ‘right to intervene’ that they have yet to 
properly address.10 In sum, they are in serious danger, through a combination of hubris and 
naivety, of becoming adjuncts to the emerging imperial project. 
 
                                                
7  M. Duffield, Global governance and the new wars, London: Zed, 2001, ch.3. Duffield prefers the term 
‘liberal’ over the terms ‘imperial’ or ‘imperialist’ to describe the emerging structures of global governance. This 
on the grounds that there are few, if any, instances in the contemporary world of formal imperial occupations.  
However, along with Hardt and Negri, I am with those who prefer ‘imperial’. Historians are familiar with the 
concept of ‘informal empire’ and it seems to me to adequately encapsulate what is developing today. 
8 I am not necessarily arguing that this cooling of enthusiasm is the result of a ‘formal’ decision by these 
organisations. In my experience, it has happened more subtly than that as the ‘parameters of the possible’ on 
impunity have changed. 
9 The problems they have in constructing partnerships are not so different from those encountered in the past by 
international organisations operating in the spheres of development and humanitarianism, on which there is an 
extensive academic literature. 
10 On the right of intervention, see T. Allen & D. Styan, ‘A right to interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the new 
humanitarianism’, Journal of International Development, 12 (2000). 
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Justice and the crisis of humanitarianism 
In the early 1990s, as the dust was settling after the cold war, neutralist humanitarian 
discourse and practice played a dominant role in justifying international interventions in the 
‘post-ideological’ small wars that appeared to have replaced it. However, humanitarianism 
proved to be an inadequate ideological basis on its own for the emerging imperial project. 
Over the years that have followed, neutralist humanitarianism has come to be overshadowed 
and reshaped by impartial ideologies of human rights. 
 
The dilemmas of humanitarianism are, of course, many. They are particularly vividly 
illustrated, as other authors have already argued, by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).11 The 
OLS experience played a significant part in shaping the thinking of key advocates for a 
human rights-dominated political humanitarianism. OLS arose out of the famine of 1985-
1989 in southern Sudan, site of a brutal and protracted civil war between a series of Arab-
dominated northern-based governments (currently the National Islamic Front, NIF) and a 
predominantly African, Christian/animist insurgency, led by the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA). At the time of its first introduction, it seemed to many people to represent an 
important advance in the humanitarian agenda: negotiated access to areas of insurgency that 
had previously been blocked by the government, and the provision of food aid to those in 
need. Over time OLS came to be part of an institutionalised arrangement with the 
government. This inevitably gave the government some control over the operation. Critics 
argued that OLS became progressively integrated into the political economy of the civil war 
in Sudan. Both the government and the SPLA worked out sophisticated strategies for the 
manipulation of aid to provision their forces and maintain their garrisons. OLS consistently 
helped the government to avoid the fall of the key town of Juba, for example. In the Nuba 
mountains, the government forced OLS to provide support only to the areas that it held. 
During the 1990s, when there were splits between different factions originally in the SPLA, 
food aid undoubtedly also helped to sustain these different factions. 
 
The UN had to decide whether to supply relief in the absence of guarantees that it would not 
be misappropriated. For its critics, it allowed the imperative of ‘operationality’ to triumph 
over ‘principle’. But is that fair criticism? Which principles are we talking about here? Should 
there be no relief unless there are such guarantees? How are such guarantees to be obtained? 
Who is to enforce them? While it is crucial to seek ways to address such concerns – for 
example, by doing everything possible to improve safeguards that relief is not 
misappropriated, the fundamental question remains: what is your bottom line, the point at 
which you decide not to provide relief? These dilemmas are certainly not unique to OLS. 
They have been encountered in many other complex emergencies in Africa – Angola, for 
example. The move towards ‘negotiated access’ arose out of what were perceived as the costs 
of all other alternatives: if you simply work with the government, vast numbers of people 
might starve in ‘enemy areas’. However, if you simply defy the government, relief moves 
explicitly into the political domain, makes itself a target, may lead to expulsion of your 
organisation from government-held areas. The experience of humanitarians in the first great 
African intervention of the Biafran war still looms large in people’s minds. So, then, is 
‘negotiated access’ actually the ‘least worst solution’? Is that the most we can hope for? 
 
                                                
11 There is now a voluminous literature on OLS. For important points of departure, see chapters 8 and 9 of 
Duffield (2001), and chapter 7 of Alex de Waal, Famine crimes. Politics and the disaster relief industry in 
Africa, London & Bloomington: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1997a. 
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In February 2002, the Sudanese air force bombed civilians collecting a World Food 
Programme (WFP) food drop in southern Sudan, five people, including a Medecin Sans 
Frontiers (MSF) worker, were killed. In the same month, it also attacked a relief centre in a 
rebel-held area of southern Sudan, where major deposits of oil lie waiting to be exploited that 
the government is desperate to control. At least 24 civilians were killed that time. The US 
promptly suspended its mediation of ‘peace talks’ between the government and the SPLA. 
Thirteen NGOs working in north and south Sudan condemned the attack and suggested that 
“clear and consistent ‘disincentives’ [i.e. sanctions] for warring parties who commit abuses 
should be agreed”. The Sudanese government called this attack a “mistake”, and set up a 
military-led commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. Alex de Waal, commented:  
For the last 18 years the south has been an ethics-free zone. If Khartoum were to 
forgo attacking civilians it would have to abandon its current military strategy in 
the oilfields. Its entire strategy is based on displacing the population that lives 
around the oilfields.  
Catherine Bertini, chief of the WFP, described this attack as “an intolerable affront to human 
life and humanitarian work”.12 For Alex de Waal, what these and other examples of 
humanitarianism in practice shows is that “when the intolerable occurs, they [humanitarians] 
proceed to tolerate it”.13  
 
The critique of humanitarian aid has been perhaps most forcefully expressed in Alex de 
Waal’s 1997 book, Famine Crimes, which focuses on the role of what he calls “the 
humanitarian international” in policies to address and relieve famine in Africa. The 
humanitarian international, according to him, is composed of a transnational elite of relief 
workers, aid-dispensing officials, academics, journalists and the institutions they work for. 
Also joining its ranks increasingly are experts in conflict resolution and human rights 
workers.14 There are a number of problems with the activities of this ‘international’, 
according to de Waal and others. First, it has often shown itself to be fundamentally 
unaccountable to the ‘objects’ of its interventions in African complex emergencies: the local 
state (where it functions and has a degree of legitimacy) and the wider local population. If the 
internationals that flood in whenever there is an emergency are accountable to anybody it is to 
their own organisations (which must successfully reproduce themselves) and to funders. Local 
knowledge and survival/coping strategies are too often discounted and undervalued. Second, 
humanitarian aid in Africa is only pretendedly ‘non-political’. Behind the scenes it is often 
manipulated by those who control and fund it to fit their ‘political objectives’. This can lead 
to an unacceptable selectivity in where, when and how much humanitarian aid is supplied. 
Agencies dependent on international government funding are often slow to criticise their 
paymasters openly. The experience in Somalia during 1991-1993 contained many such 
examples of this, according to de Waal. The pretendedly non-political stance of humanitarian 
agencies means that they generally remain silent in the face of human rights abuses, or at best 
pass information about abuses on to human rights NGOs that are prepared to go public. The 
need to protect aid operations is thus ‘traded off’ against actions that could address issues of 
accountability and impunity that are root causes of the conflict. Third, when humanitarian aid 
agencies intervene in complex emergencies in Africa, they often fuel conflict rather than 
dousing the flames, for example by creating opportunities for the (mis)appropriation of funds 
and food or for the achievement of wider political objectives by parties to a conflict. 
Humanitarian aid agencies usually have to act in cooperation with state authorities or armed 
                                                
12 Guardian, 7 March 2002. 
13 De Waal (1997a), p.147. 
14 De Waal (1997a), p.65. 
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groups that are parties to the conflict. All too often, they try to direct resources towards their 
own supporters and away from their enemies. This was certainly the case in the refugee 
camps in Eastern Zaire between 1994-1997, when Hutu militias used humanitarian aid to 
rebuild their fighting capacity. This problem has become increasingly important because 
much violence in sub-Saharan Africa has an economic motivation, whatever claims are made 
in terms of grievances. Also, the herding of refugees or internally-displaced people (IDPs) 
into ‘camps’, while convenient for agencies and host states, is often disempowering and, 
again, can play into the hands of armed groups, which are often not effectively disarmed and 
have a captive audience in camps.  
 
De Waal does propose a way forward for humanitarian aid agencies in complex emergencies 
in Africa. Although he is critical of the type of ‘politics’ that underpins their activities in too 
many cases, he has increasingly argued that the way forward is not to try to depoliticise 
humanitarianism but to acknowledge that it cannot avoid politics and seek to politicise it in 
ways that mean that its interventions empower local capacities and help promote respect for 
human rights – above all the principle of retributive justice (i.e. the prosecution of 
perpetrators of abuses). For the empowerment of local capacities to happen, he argues that the 
power relations within the humanitarian community must change fundamentally. With regard 
to the latter, humanitarian aid agencies should place enforcement of human rights at the heart 
of their agendas and must ‘speak out’ when they encounter human rights abuses. In the 
absence of such a shift, it will often be better if there are no outside interventions.  
 
In recent years we have seen the emergence of a ‘critique of the critique’ of humanitarian aid 
in Africa’s complex emergencies. Among the most important exponents of this ‘critique of 
the critique’ have been Macrae and Stockton.15 They are not simple apologists for the 
humanitarian international, to return to de Waal’s phrase. They accept that there is a crisis and 
indeed, that this crisis may turn out to be fatal. However, they do not accept that the many 
failings mean that the entire ‘project’ is invalidated. The true agenda, they would argue, is to 
improve the ways in which humanitarian aid is provided. This obviously involves action to 
improve logistical systems, distribution and monitoring mechanisms, needs assessment 
processes, but also the development of more effective and meaningful structures of local 
participation and systems of accountability. They believe that de Waal’s emphasis on “relief 
as encouraging dependency” is exaggerated and that his privileging of local solutions is 
misplaced. Local solutions, they point out, need not be creative. Such an emphasis may 
simply mean that the local power brokers have a free hand in places where ‘civil society’ is 
weak or non-existent. Indeed, conflict/crisis is a particularly hostile context for civil society, 
which is often itself under direct attack. The struggle will be for survival and if humanitarian 
aid agencies take a hands-off attitude, the outcome could simply be greater casualties.  
 
Stockton also quite convincingly argues that humanitarian aid is only one part of the political 
economy of war. Many wars have been fuelled by struggles over natural resources and trading 
profits, rather than over humanitarian aid. It is important to note that much of the critique of 
the role of humanitarian aid in fuelling conflict was developed in relation to countries like 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique, which lacked easily exploitable high-value commodities 
such as diamonds. Finally, in terms of humanitarian aid propping up unrepresentative 
regimes, Stockton and others have claimed that this argument applies more to development 
aid than to humanitarian aid. Longer-term aid has certainly played that role. As for the thorny 
question of politics, they defend the principle that humanitarian aid agencies should avoid 
                                                
15 Joanna Macrae, ‘The death of humanitarianism? An anatomy of the attack’, Disasters, 22:4 (December 1998); 
Nick Stockton, ‘In defence of humanitarianism’, Disasters, 22:4 (December 1998). 
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overtly political interventions – not because it is possible to operate ‘outside of politics’ but 
because there are different imperatives in humanitarian emergencies and a division of labour 
is necessary. Humanitarian aid workers should focus on the preservation of human life and 
dignity in complex emergencies. Other actors should take on the politics and broader 
questions of active and effective enforcement of human rights. For her part, Macrae has 
argued that what in fact has been happening is the capture of humanitarian action by political 
action (a certain kind of integration) and that this development has been endorsed by the 
majority of humanitarian aid agencies, so legitimising it.16 
 
It seems to me that a ‘new humanitarianism’ that is rights-based rather than needs based may 
be trying to emerge. The human rights agenda could become the official face of this ‘new 
humanitarianism’. Some advocates of this seem to assume that humanitarianism can 
unproblematically absorb a human rights agenda. However, I agree with Macrae when she 
argues that the possibility has to be left open that in practice it will not be possible to square 
every circle. There will be ‘moral dilemmas’ or ‘tough choices’ to face, in which it may be 
unavoidable to choose between two evils. Hugo Slim’s work has been extremely instructive in 
this regard.17 He looks at a number of scenarios where ‘moral dilemmas’ have been presented. 
For example, he looks at the provision of humanitarian aid to Hutu refugees in East Zaire 
following the Rwandan genocide, which he presents as ‘aid without justice’. He argues that it 
was justified to provide humanitarian aid here on the grounds that it would have been 
dangerous to withhold a definite good or benefit (aid) for the sake of a desirable but uncertain 
future good (justice). Alex de Waal has taken the view that the greater good here, given that 
many of the refugees were genocidaires, should have been justice. Accordingly, he opposed 
any efforts to prevent the Rwandan government and its surrogates from enforcing a less than 
fully voluntary repatriation of hundreds of thousands of the refugees in 1997 through military 
action.18 Slim applies the same argument with regard to the Ethiopian famine in the mid-
1980s, where he argues that had all agencies told the truth about how the Ethiopian 
government was using the refugee camps established to provide aid to the starving as a basis 
for organising politically-motivated forced resettlement schemes, there was little guarantee 
that the international community would have responded. Much more certain was that the 
government would throw them out of the country, as were MSF, the only agency to speak out.  
 
The ‘new humanitarianism’ also presents wider ‘moral dilemmas’ that touch on issues of 
power. Governmental global elites in the North have to a significant degree internalised the 
discourse of human rights. But they have done so with varying degrees of sincerity. I fear that 
some aspects of human rights are going to be raised above others in this discourse of power. 
Within the language of human rights, the concept of retributive justice, or punishment of 
perpetrators of abuses, has been elevated above others. But these elites have not abandoned 
their realpolitikal hats. Decisions about interventions are still strongly shaped by this 
realpolitik, making the ‘new humanitarianism’ an unstable mix of principle and pragmatism, 
inherently selective in character. In the end, for all of the power of De Waal’s critique, I do 
not believe that the conditions exist for the effective and legitimate ‘full operationalisation’ of 
the justice-based approach to humanitarian aid he posits, based on his African case-studies in 
Famine Crimes. If humanitarian aid is to be withheld from a particular area or group, then 
                                                
16 J. Macrae & N. Leader, ‘Apples, pears and porridge: The origins and impact of the search for ‘coherence’ 
between humanitarian and political responses to chronic political emergencies’, Disasters, 25:4 (2001). 
17 Hugo Slim, ‘Doing the right thing: Relief agencies, moral dilemmas and moral responsibility in political 
emergencies and war’, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Studies on emergencies and disaster relief, 6, 1997. 
18 Alex de Waal, ‘Becoming shameless. The failure of human rights organisations in Rwanda’, Times Literary 
Supplement (21 February 1997b). See also De Waal (1997a), ch.10. 
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who exactly is entitled to make these decisions and what mechanisms of representation can 
make these decisions legitimate?19 
 
It should be noted that, for all of his criticisms of neutralist humanitarianism, De Waal is also 
highly critical of international human rights organisations. His grounds are that they can never 
be fully and explicitly political. While their commitment to impartiality is an advance upon 
neutrality, they are still, in his view, often infected by the bacillus of even-handedness. This 
can limit their ability to take sides and back political and military forces that are likely to be 
the best hope for change. In his view, this was what happened in Rwanda, where AI and 
HRW focused excessively on the failings of the new Rwanda Patriotic Front government and 
too little on the genocidaires.20 
 
My view is different. I believe that both humanitarian agencies and human rights 
organisations need to understand and accept that they are indeed engaged, and unavoidably 
implicated, in politics. To pretend otherwise is naïve. They need to formulate strategies based 
on high-quality historical and political analysis and establish criteria for assessing what their 
‘bottom-lines’ are in specific situations where there may be ‘moral dilemmas’ for them. The 
inherent value of humanitarian aid based on need should be upheld – the presumption should 
be for such provision – but these bottom-lines may indeed justify non-provision of 
humanitarian aid on occasions. In terms of Slim’s distinction between deontology and 
teleology – that is, undertaking a ‘good’ action regardless of possible ‘bad consequences’ or 
only undertaking a ‘good’ action if there are no or insufficient ‘bad consequences’ – the best 
course is surely to seek to negotiate the inevitable tensions between the two when they arise 
and reach a judgement, not to opt a priori for one or the other.21 But this is not the same as 
becoming ‘explicitly political’, wearing politics on your sleeve, which is what De Waal and 
others seem to suggest should happen. To do so would be to run the danger of entirely closing 
the traditional ‘humanitarian space’ of neutral and impartial provision based on need, for all 
of its many problems. I suggest that what is required are variations upon a sophisticated and 
self-reflexive political ‘anti-politics’ that reflects a clear division of labour between the 
international humanitarian NGOs and their human rights counterparts.22 
 
Above all else, both international humanitarian and human rights NGOs must continuously 
strive to avoid becoming too close to the most powerful states and funders within the global 
order. Of course, this is a bit like trying to defy gravity. Although they are formally 
‘independent’, more and more have close, sometimes umbilical, links to governments. This 
does not require a ban on constructive engagement with officialdom, but that engagement 
should be based on as independent a position as possible. This may mean a reduction in the 
amount of funds that can be accessed and in the capacity to operate on the ground, at least in 
the short term. New strategies for increasing independent capacities to provide aid may need 
to be devised that involve, greater self-reliance, much greater decentralisation of power, 
                                                
19 I owe this observation to David Keen. 
20 De Waal (1997b). 
21 Slim (1997). As Jenny Edkins has written: “you’ve got to decide, but you’ll never know” (‘Legality with a 
vengeance: humanitarian relief in complex emergencies’, Millennium, 25:3 (1996), p.575). This does not, of 
course, mean that we should not build up bodies of evidence to help us decide; rather, it points out correctly that 
we can never generate sufficient evidence to know for sure what the right action would be. 
22 This is not a blanket or unconditional affirmation of ‘anti-politics’. The term ‘anti-politics’ has a long history 
of its own that I do not have space to go into here. For example, see James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine. 
‘Development’, depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997.   
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personnel and resources to local allies, construction of more equitable partnerships with local 
organisations and even greater mobilisation of public opinion in home countries.  
 
It is, of course, essential that explicit politics of the right kind (i.e. that which pursues social 
justice, including an end to impunity) occurs where there are complex emergencies if they are 
ever to be brought to an end. With that I am entirely with De Waal. But international 
humanitarian or human rights NGOs should not attempt to substitute themselves (or allow 
themselves to be substituted) for it. They cannot themselves be explicitly political; nor should 
they simply act as cheerleaders for selective interventions by powerful states. From their 
different vantage points, humanitarians and human rights activists should seek at all times to 
avoid to endangering or closing the spaces within which forces for positive political change 
may be developing. But solidarities and advocacy for that change should remain ‘relatively 
veiled’, wrapped up in the twin discourses of neutrality and impartiality. This is the relatively 
limited role that they can play.23  
 
 
Justice and reconstruction 
A debate has been going on within the international human rights movement over the past 
decade between the absolutists and those who advocate strategies of ‘transitional justice’.24 
Over the past 20 years, it has become increasingly widely accepted that strategies for 
resolving conflict and the reconstruction of societies following conflict should contain 
elements that address issues of accountability for human rights violations and preventing 
future such violations. This reflects the rise of a new moral discourse and the growing 
legitimacy of international humanitarian and human rights law, not least through the efforts of 
international NGOs like AI and HRW. It is worth noting too, that the rise of this new moral 
discourse was also in part due to its usefulness to the West in the context of the cold war. The 
focus of the new ‘human rights discourse’ was on civil and political rights – although with 
varying degrees of sincerity, these were seen as essential preconditions for the realisation of 
economic, social and political rights, with which the socialist world was more concerned. 
With the collapse of communism after 1989, the main obstacle to the further consolidation of 
the new moral discourse of human rights was removed. 
 
There have been a range of ways in which issues of accountability for human rights 
violations, known as the fight against impunity in ‘human rights discourse’, have been 
addressed since the early 1980s. There have been justice strategies, truth strategies and 
reconciliation strategies in the context of reconstruction efforts. What I want to do is to 
summarise what I mean by each of them – as Pankhurst writes, there is no straightforward 
                                                
23 While I would not want to overstretch the point, I have been intrigued by possible echoes here of John Rawls’s 
“veil of ignorance” (A theory of justice, London: Oxford University Press, 1971). Rawls asks us to construct a 
theory of justice by imagining what kind of social order would best suit us if we did not know our own gender, 
race or class, or those of our parents. The result, he suggests, is that we would choose a social order that was fair, 
so that if we turned out to suffer from certain disadvantages we could be hopeful that opportunities would be 
provided for redressing them. In terms of my own argument, the primary echo of Rawls derives from his 
suggestion that progressive politics may sometimes best be served by pretending that you are not in full 
possession of the facts. Perhaps his “veil of ignorance” is an exercise in the “strategic naivety” that I argue in the 
conclusion is a necessary approach for human rights activists? 
24 The literature is now voluminous, so I will refer here only to a few of the most important contributions: 
Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable truths. Confronting state terror and anarchy, New York: Routledge, 2001; Neil 
Kritz (ed.), Transitional justice. How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, New York: United 
States Institute for Peace, 1993; Juan Mendez, ‘Accountability for human rights abuses’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 19:2 (1997).  
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consensus as to their meaning – and then to review the intense debate that has taken place 
over their value and what the appropriate relationship between them should be.25 
 
Justice strategies26 
These have a long but, until recently, rather episodic history. Justice here means retributive 
justice – trial and punishment – rather than restorative justice (non-judicial forms of 
reparation and compensation), which is briefly addressed below in the context of 
reconciliation strategies.  
 
The founding moment for justice strategies is the trial of German ‘war criminals’ following 
the end of the Second World War. But justice has been the exception rather than the rule in 
the period since then in terms of peace processes/democratic transitions. Most peace 
agreements/transition processes have been accompanied by amnesties, although that is 
becoming less common now. It is only since the end of the Cold War that justice strategies 
have come back onto the agenda with the creation of the ad hoc international tribunals in 
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia and the beginning of prosecutions by domestic governments 
in, for example, South Africa and Cambodia. The international tribunals reflect a growing 
acceptance that, where national governments will not or cannot act, the international 
community has an obligation to do so under international human rights law in relation to 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Trials are often, but do not have to be, left to a post-
conflict/regime-change period, in contrast to Truth Commissions (see below).  
 
Arguments for the justice ‘track’ are primarily based on the right of victims to effective 
remedy, whether under national or international human rights law. If societies are to be built 
on new foundations based on the supremacy of the rule of law, it is argued, individual 
perpetrators must be held accountable and punished wherever possible. Criminal 
responsibility must be established and sanctions imposed or potential future perpetrators will 
know that they will be able to get away with abuses in future. At the same time, trials can also 
assist in helping victims to find out the truth about what happened to their loved ones. 
Punishment of those who have transgressed is also the best form of promoting individual 
healing. 
 
Truth strategies27 
These first came to the fore in Latin and Central America in the 1980s, both before the end of 
the cold war and afterwards. The best-known mechanism is the official Truth Commission, 
established in the context of a peace agreement between the government and guerrilla groups 
or in the context of the end of authoritarian rule and a ‘democratic transition’. As such, they 
are post-conflict/regime-change institutions. Countries in Latin and Central America that have 
set up Truth Commissions are Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala. A Commission was 
established in Peru following the downfall of Alberto Fujimori. However, the ‘model’ has 
spread and been adapted to other parts of the world, for example Africa, where commissions 
have been established in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria – and most famously, South Africa.28 
                                                
25 Donna Pankhurst, ‘Issues of justice and reconciliation in complex political emergencies: conceptualizing 
reconciliation, justice and peace’, Third World Quarterly, 20:1 (1999). 
26 For passionate and sophisticated argument in favour of strategies that prioritise retributive justice, see 
Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against humanity. The struggle for global justice, London: Penguin, 2000. 
27 For the best introduction to arguments in favour of truth processes, see Hayner (2001). 
28 On the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see in particular: Brandon Hamber & Steve 
Kibble, ‘From truth to transformation: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, CIIR Briefing 
Paper, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1999; Richard A. Wilson, The politics of truth and 
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There has also been a growth in civil society ‘truth strategies’ during the 1990s, often 
responding to the absence of official action in this sphere but also to perceived weaknesses in 
official commissions. Two notable examples have been Guatemala, where the Catholic 
Church undertook its own unofficial commission of inquiry; and Zimbabwe, where a coalition 
of NGOs and religious bodies did the same.29 It is crucial to note that official truth 
commissions are not judicial but political bodies. They address accountability in a non-
judicial form, although the South African variant had some ‘semi-judicial’ qualities.  
 
What are the key arguments for a truth ‘track’? Several are put forward. It is argued that truth 
processes provide means by which the facts can be established as to what happened during a 
conflict or period of dictatorship. Truth processes respond to the fact to that people have a 
right to know the truth about past human rights violations. Unless the truth is known, it is 
argued, how can a new society be built? An official policy of amnesia increases the possibility 
of a repetition. Michael Ignatieff has written that such processes are vital in “narrowing the 
range of permissable lies”.30 At the same time, people can only begin to move on, try to get 
over their suffering, if they know what happened to their loved ones. As such, truth processes 
are vital to national and individual healing processes.  
 
Reconciliation strategies31 
Strategies for promoting reconciliation have developed considerably over the past 20 years as 
well, particularly in the context of efforts to end conflicts. National Reconciliation 
Commissions often create forums for debate and dialogue and undertake public awareness 
work. Reconciliation activities sometimes involve non-judicial forms of reparation and 
compensation, as is supposed to be the case in South Africa in terms of the recommendations 
of the TRC.  Some governments also provide public psychosocial/‘therapeutic’ services. 
Community-level activities, frequently led by local NGOs and religious bodies, often do more 
of this type of work. This work can take place at any time, although security considerations 
mean that it is usually most effective and concerted post-conflict/regime-change.  
 
What are the arguments for a reconciliation ‘track’? Those who emphasise reconciliation 
strategies argue that official truth or justice strategies will not necessarily be sufficient to 
promote peace at national or community/individual levels. They claim that there is a need for 
specific initiatives aimed at bringing about reconciliation at both the national and 
community/individual levels. Protagonists for reconciliation work point out that by promoting 
means of debate, dialogue and ‘therapy’, all of which help people come to terms with the past, 
foundations for greater accountability and respect for the rule of law can be strengthened. The 
reconciliation dimension can also be more sensitive to local and cultural realities and geared 
to the long-term. Those who work in this area claim that these considerations can also ensure 
that the prospects for building a new society are improved.32 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
reconciliation in South Africa. Legitimising the Post-Apartheid state, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001. 
29 Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala. Never Again!, London: Catholic Institute 
for International Relations/Latin America Bureau, 1999; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Zimbabwe 
and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the silence, building true peace: A report on the disturbances in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-88, Harare: CCJP/LRF, 1997. 
30 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Articles of faith’, Index on Censorship, 25:5 (1996), p.113. 
31 For a particularly eloquent albeit highly personal discussion of the issue of reconciliation, see Bishop 
Desmond Tutu, No future without forgiveness, London: Rider Books, 1999. 
32 Pankhurst (1999), pp.241-248. 
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In principle, all three ‘tracks’ can clearly be seen to have a role to play in reconstructing war-
torn societies or building democracy after a regime-change. They are not inherently 
incompatible with each other and can reinforce each other. Truth processes have undoubtedly 
helped to deliver justice, whether of the restorative or retributive kind. Trials have indeed 
produced facts, as have reconciliation processes based on dialogue and debate. Reconciliation 
activities can assist in processes of restorative justice and encourage truth-telling. Yet in 
practice, there can also be tensions between the different ‘tracks’ depending on the specific 
context in which they are operating. It is certainly not always possible to run the three tracks 
simultaneously. This is particularly so in relationship to the tracks of truth and justice. Most 
peace processes and regime-changes take place in a context where there has been no decisive 
victor. There is no simple ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ in such contests. Those who are engaged in 
conflict resolution or promoting ‘democratic transition’ are then faced with a dilemma. If 
there is no clear ‘loser’, what is the incentive for those who still hold power or who have lived 
by the barrel of the gun to give ground if their reward will be prosecution for human rights 
violations? If that is the case, do you renounce the possibility of a peace based on compromise 
in order to carry on the struggle until you have defeated them and can try them whether they 
like it or not? Is a possible price of many more innocent civilian deaths worth it? Archbishop 
Tutu has called this approach “justice with ashes”. It starts to look as if the absence of trials in 
the immediate context of past conflict-resolution/regime-change is not simply a matter of lack 
of political will, but reflects the fact that most such processes are based on political 
compromise, however much we might prefer them not to be. Furthermore, it is often not easy 
to make clear and easy distinctions between ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ – child soldiers in 
Sierra Leone, for example – which is the language of retributive justice. Who do you 
prosecute in this situation?  
 
It was the fact that so many conflict-resolution/regime-change processes were based on 
compromise that made the justice track a difficult or impossible one, and created the space for 
the development of the truth track in South and Central America in the 1980s. While there are 
self-sufficient, independent and strong grounds for arguing for the value of Truth 
Commissions, in practice there is no doubt in my mind that they emerged at that moment in 
part as a second-best form of accountability, a partial substitute for the lack of retributive 
justice where that was not possible politically. What is striking is that human rights NGOs 
such as AI and HRW, both of which are justice-oriented organisations, were relatively 
positive about Truth Commissions in the late-1980s and early-1990s. That seems to have 
changed in recent years.33 They have moved steadily towards a position of judicial 
absolutism. The imperatives of the struggle for justice at the global level – boosted by the 
successful establishment of the ad hoc international tribunals and, more recently, the 
International Criminal Court – now appear to be prevailing over messy local realities in which 
the struggle for justice is likely to be fully won only over a prolonged period of time. This in 
turn has created a greater enthusiasm for a potentially endless ‘war for human rights’. It has 
also promoted a tendency to go for ‘quick fix’ solutions in which the ends justify the means. 
Witness, for example, the ‘buying’ in 2001 of Slobodan Milosevic for the Hague Tribunal 
through a US threat to withdraw aid to Serbia. 
 
Against this judicial absolutism I would support an approach which I think is much more 
likely to promote durable and credible processes of reconstruction where a conflict has ended 
or a regime-transition is under way. This is the approach of ‘transitional justice’, under which 
a wider range of strategies for promoting accountability are viewed as potentially valuable. 
                                                
33 For example, see some of AI’s reports on El Salvador in the early 1990s at the time of its Truth Commission. 
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This school of thought first surfaced in the 1980s in a context where the possibility of judicial 
prosecution was more remote than it is today.  
 
I would argue that it is important to consider the consequences of pursuing the three ‘tracks’ I 
have identified for building peace and not to see judicial action as the be-all and end-all. This 
does not require the complete abandonment of principles. But there will be tensions during 
many transitions between principles and consequences and they cannot be wished away. 
Accordingly, so-called ‘second best’ strategies may be more appropriate in the short to 
medium-term while helping to keep the option of judicial action open in the longer-term. If 
the new Chilean government had tried to try Pinochet for human rights abuses straight after 
he had left office, what would the consequences for Chile’s democratic transition have been?  
 
The debate about transitional justice is heating up. In 2001, a well-funded International Center 
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) set up shop in New York.34 Yet ‘transitional justice’ also has 
some weaknesses that need to be addressed. The most important is that while it has embraced 
‘transition’, it is still sometimes too quick to posit strategies that wish away the realities of 
‘trade-off’s’. This has been seen in Sierra Leone, where a ‘have it all’ philosophy seems to 
have prevailed, in which the ‘over time’ dimension was almost entirely lost. Also, having 
become increasingly located wholly inside the discourse of human rights, there are in-built 
limits to how far interventions can be based on solidly grounded historical and political 
analysis. It also tends to privilege the international over the local, which is reflected in the 
lack of clear thinking to date on local processes that can build legitimacy for ‘appropriate’ 
transitional justice strategies (taking us to problematic but important concepts of participation 
and ownership). Finally, the ‘transitional justice’ camp needs to do more to open up the 
debate with stakeholders in the south, including those who work in the spheres of economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
 
 
Case study: Sierra Leone 
In the context of the peace process in Sierra Leone, two institutions have been established to 
address the legacy of human rights abuses committed during ten years of violent conflict. A 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was endorsed under the 1999 peace agreement 
to undertake an honest reckoning with the past, including addressing the causes of the 
conflict. It was established in the context of a blanket amnesty for perpetrators of human 
rights abuses, although the UN refused to accept that the amnesty applied under international 
law. A Special Court was agreed by the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) in 
2000, following events in May of that year in which the rebel group, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) was accused of attempting a coup against the peace process. The 
weakened position of the RUF following the May events made it possible partially to amend 
the amnesty provisions in the 1999 peace agreement. In legislation passed in early 2002 by 
the GOSL it was stated that those with the ‘greatest responsibility’ for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed after 1996 would now be brought to justice by an ad hoc 
tribunal.35 What was new, as compared with its Rwandan and former-Yugoslavian cousins, 
                                                
34 The ICTJ (http://www.ictj.org) is currently heavily backed financially by the Ford Foundation, which has 
traditionally been sympathetic to strategies of transitional justice. This is in contrast to George Soros’ Open 
Society Institute, the other major foundation that supports human rights activities, which has become more 
sceptical of such strategies during the 1990s, much as have done AI and HRW.  
35 The Statute to establish the International Criminal Court had not yet come into force and the Court has no 
capacity to try cases retrospectively. Accordingly, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the 
conflict in Sierra Leone cannot come under its jurisdiction. 
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was that this tribunal would be deliberately ‘hybrid’, in that it would have a joint 
international/Sierra Leone character and composition and would operate simultaneously under 
both international and national jurisdiction. It was anticipated that it would try 20-30 people. 
The vast majority of alleged perpetrators would appear before the TRC, whose mandate 
extends from 1991 to the end of the conflict. 
 
Between 1998 and 2001 I was working in London for the small international free expression 
organisation, ARTICLE 19.  I first visited Sierra Leone in July 1998 and became involved in 
truth, justice and reconciliation issues in the years that followed.36 While we always opposed 
any idea of a blanket amnesty for perpetrators, as a freedom of expression organisation, we 
focused particularly strongly on the importance of truth processes, possibly including a truth 
commission, as an essential piece in the jigsaw of Sierra Leone’s long-term recovery. Such 
processes could assist in the realisation of the right of its citizens to know the truth about what 
happened and why, while at the same time providing a forum for them to have their own say. 
As the possibility of peace negotiations increased in early 1999, we along with many local 
organisations tactically supported the idea of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
as a way of avoiding in any future peace deal a repetition of the blanket amnesty that featured 
in the abortive 1996 Abidjan agreement. However, this tactic was unsuccessful and what 
emerged was the TRC. It has become clear since then that the international community, 
including key actors such as Britain and the US, exerted great pressure on the GOSL to accept 
another blanket amnesty in pursuit of peace. Following the RUF ‘coup’ of May 2000, both 
Britain and the US abruptly changed policies and pushed strongly for some kind of judicial 
tribunal. It could be speculated that May 2000 was in part an act of force majeure by Britain 
and the US, with GOSL support, to shift the balance of forces against the RUF. If so, it may 
throw new light upon their alleged ‘appeasement’ of the RUF in 1999.  
 
Following the 1999 peace agreement, while continuing to call for a judicial component in the 
peace process, ARTICLE 19 argued for critical support for the TRC on the grounds that a 
process that unearthed the truth (or, at least, some of it) would still be worthwhile, provided it 
passed key tests of credibility and effectiveness. It was at this point that we parted company 
with AI and HRW. While they did not condemn the TRC, their position was a blend of 
indifference and scepticism about what it could achieve in the absence of judicial action. 
Following the establishment of the Special Court, the two organisations did not engage with 
the TRC process, except insofar as it might complicate criminal prosecutions by the Special 
Court, to which they assigned primacy. 
 
In 2001, as preparations for the establishment of the two institutions advanced slowly, 
ARTICLE 19 publicly suggested that they should be consciously sequenced. The TRC should 
go first, as it went with the grain of a fragile peace process, was non-punitive and thereby less 
of a ‘threat’.37 The Special Court should come afterwards, once peace was consolidated and 
the possibility of returning to conflict had been reduced through disarmament and other 
measures. ARTICLE 19’s arguments found few international supporters. One of the key 
organisations involved with both transitional institutions, the ICTJ, dismissed the proposal on 
the grounds that individuals that might be prosecuted by the Special Court, including jailed 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh, would have to remain in detention for a very long period while the 
                                                
36 For an account of ARTICLE 19’s activities between 1998 and 2000, see its report, Moments of truth in Sierra 
Leone. Contextualising the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, London: ARTICLE 19, 2000. 
37 This argument was summarised in an article in the June/July 2001 issue of the bi-monthly Truth Bulletin  
published in Freetown by the Sierra Leone Working Group on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Copies 
are available from the author or the Working Group. 
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TRC ran its course.38 By taking this stand, an organisation that advocates ‘transitional justice’ 
allied itself with AI and HRW, both of whom were adamant that justice deferred could only 
be justice denied. For the ICTJ, the transition could be highly compressed. In the end, the UN 
and the GOSL decided to run the two institutions in parallel.  
 
The ICTJ’s position at the time seemed to me to illustrate vividly the problems with a 
conception of ‘transitional justice’ that simply operates through human rights criteria and that 
appears to lack a capacity to undertake historical and political analysis in the context of 
specific transitions. To have advocated otherwise might have been to prejudice the ICTJ’s 
human rights credentials, given that they increasingly depend upon an unquestioning 
acceptance of the mantra ‘no peace without justice’.39 Certainly, the emergence on the scene 
of the ICTJ has been met with some ambivalence on the part of AI and HRW.  
 
One of the tests of credibility and effectiveness of the TRC identified by ARTICLE 19 and its 
main partner in Sierra Leone, the Working Group on Truth and Reconciliation (SLWG), was 
the degree to which it would be based on Sierra Leone participation and ownership. While the 
formal structures and mechanisms established under the TRC Act of February 2000 appeared 
to lay a solid basis for meeting these tests (four out of seven commissioners, including the 
chair, are Sierra Leoneans), the TRC process almost immediately failed this test. The Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had a lead responsibility for 
developing the mandate and parameters of the TRC, and drafting legislation. Once the 
legislation was passed, it took on the task of overseeing the process of setting up the 
institution before handing over to an Interim Secretariat for the three-month preparatory phase 
ahead of full operationalisation. There were warning signs during the consultation phase 
leading up to the passage of the TRC Act. The OHCHR, working with the UN mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), displayed a decidedly limited sense of what ‘consultation’ means. 
There was certainly only a cursory effort to consult with ordinary Sierra Leoneans. Even with 
regard to local NGOs, consultation was not extensive. Draft documents on the TRC’s 
prospective mandate and parameters were poorly and reluctantly circulated by the OHCHR. 
Once the draft legislation had been tabled in parliament, it was rushed through very quickly. 
There was little time for comment, and certainly none of the public hearings that were seen in 
South Africa prior to the passage of TRC legislation.  
 
Despite this, the legislation that was passed in February 2000 did appear to lay the basis for a 
credible and effective TRC. For example, it gave the TRC sub-poena powers and did not rule 
out the naming of perpetrators in the final report. However, within months of the passing of 
the TRC Act, ARTICLE 19 was joining with the SLWG in criticising the OHCHR’s failure 
adequately to publicise the recruitment process of Sierra Leonean commissioners across the 
country and its slowness to begin public sensitisation work. The response given was that the 
security situation was insufficiently stable to allow for widespread sensitisation. Even if that 
was so in the immediate aftermath of May 2000, it also reflected a preference on the part of 
the OHCHR to place resources and tasks in the hands of international NGOs, rather than 
Sierra Leonean organisations. The International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG), one of 
                                                
38 International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘The Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in Sierra Leone: Structural and operational collaboration’, unpublished discussion paper, December 2001. In the 
end, Foday Sankoh eluded justice. He died while awaiting trial in the custody of the Special Court in July 2003. 
39 Increasingly, some in the international human rights movement seem to argue that no peace is worth having 
unless it is accompanied by judicial action. Surely, the possibility must remain that some kinds of peace are 
worth having even if unaccompanied by judicial action? Mozambique is a potential example of this. A human 
rights audit might still come out in favour of a flawed peace if the alternative is a return to violence in which 
many civilians are once again targeted by armed groups. 
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whose staff had been a key consultant for OHCHR during the process of drawing up 
legislation, was awarded a contract to coordinate public sensitisation work. The IHRLG 
prioritised opening an office in Sierra Leone and appointed one of UNAMSIL’s human rights 
officers to run it during its inception phase. There was little sign of money given to the 
IHRLG by the OHCHR (originally donated by the British Government in 2000) finding its 
way through to Sierra Leonean organisations that might have been able to undertake effective 
sensitisation work, including in parts of the country where internationals might have been 
reluctant to travel.40 The IHRLG claimed to be acting independently of the OHCHR, but it 
appeared clear that it was the latter that retained control over the agenda. As has so often been 
the case, international actors seemed willing to work with local partners only on a patron-
client basis. Conditions for genuine partnership were never created. 
 
The TRC process limped forward during 2001-2002. An Interim Secretariat was established 
in early 2002 before giving way to the Permanent Secretariat in 2003. Commissioners were 
appointed but the TRC’s operational budget was reduced at the behest of donors from $10m. 
to $6m. Levels of public sensitisation remained inadequate. As the TRC began public 
hearings in 2003, popular attitudes towards it appeared to be one of confusion or 
indifference.41 Attitudes did improve significantly while the hearings were taking place but 
the TRC’s relationship with the Special Court was never adequately clarified. Many Sierra 
Leoneans did not come forward to testify, fearing either that alleged perpetrators would exact 
revenge if they did so or that they themselves might be referred to the Special Court if they 
confessed to playing a part in human rights abuses. Many also believed that the national 
commissioners were not impartial. Several did indeed have well-known connections to the 
GOSL. The TRC’s report was presented to President Kabbah in October 2004 but it was not 
until August 2005 that copies were made available to the general public. By the time it 
surfaced, the GOSL had given clear indications that it would ignore many of its 
recommendations. The prospects for an effective ‘follow-up phase’ appear poor.42  All in all, 
the TRC looks like a missed opportunity.  
 
The Special Court initially fared better, but questions about its credibility and effectiveness 
have steadily grown. It became operational in 2003 and is due to complete its work by the end 
of 2006. Donor governments, led by the US, have been keener to provide financial support to 
it than the TRC. US motives are mixed. It wants to see the development of a more streamlined 
and cost-effective model for ad hoc international tribunals as a ballast in its campaign against 
the alternative model of the standing International Criminal Court, which the US has refused 
to support. The staff of the Special Court has had a strongly North American and European 
flavouring. Many within the Sierra Leone human rights and legal communities have felt 
excluded and underutilised. If anything, public sensitisation work about the Special Court was 
initially even more cursory than that witnessed for the TRC, although its outreach work has 
gradually improved.  It is difficult to tell, but public opinion appears to be predominantly 
hostile to the Special Court. Its legalistic approach alienates many local people. Its gravest 
                                                
40 There has still been no public accounting by the OHCHR for exactly how the money donated by the British 
Government has been spent. 
41 For a recent assessment of the problems faced by the TRC which addresses some of the issues I have 
discussed, see International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A fresh start? 
(December 2004), at http://www.icg.org. 
42 For an initial study of the overall performance and impact of the TRC, see ‘Searching for truth and 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone’, a report due to be published in the near future by the SLWG and the Network 
Movement for Justice and Development. It will be available from johncaulkerfoc@yahoo.com and 
abubrima@yahoo.com. 
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problem has been that it has been unable to bring before it many of the most senior leadership 
figures of the RUF. The death of the leader, Foday Sankoh and the disappearance of Jonny 
Paul Koroma (believed to be in Ghana) means that its most important indictee is the former 
Defence Minister Hinga Norman, who was also in charge of the pro-government Kamajor 
militia during the conflict. Finally, Charles Taylor, ex-President of Liberia and the RUF’s 
godfather, continues to elude the Special Court. He is being protected by Nigeria, despite the 
fact that the country is also on the management board of the Court. 
 
It is impossible not feel a sense of unease about where the quest for justice has lead us in 
Sierra Leone. The bill for the Special Court, which is now likely to try no more than ten 
people, is projected to be at least five times the size of the amount spent on the TRC, which 
notionally covered the entire population of Sierra Leone. Meanwhile the Special Fund for 
War Victims, which was also provided for in 1999 peace agreement, is still empty. AI and 
HRW might argue that their mandates mean that such considerations cannot be their priority – 
it is for other organisations to take them up. My view is that this prioritisation needs revising; 
it flows from the process already described above, in which justice has progressively become 
defined narrowly and legalistically as judicial action. As loci of power, AI and HRW (and the 
ICTJ too, for that matter) crowd out other voices, including those who have sought to focus 
more on the TRC and/or Special Fund. In doing so, they have inadvertently played an 
important role in shaping the problematic approach to justice that we are now confronted with 
in Sierra Leone.  
 
Further, the crowding out of other voices has had a particularly negative effect with regard to 
local Sierra Leonean voices. They have been largely silent about the way in which foreign 
experts have come to dominate processes of truth, justice and reconciliation. During the 
colonial period, Africans (and other colonised peoples) were often viewed as children who 
were not ready yet for self-government. In the modern world, a similar characterisation is 
creeping back in. Locals are seen as lacking the capacity or maturity to govern themselves. 
The fact of civil war is used to demonstrate this in countries such as Sierra Leone. New forms 
of trusteeship are justified on the basis that reactionary and opportunistic local political 
leaders cannot be trusted to rule justly and fairly. AI and HRW have bought into this idea. I 
am not arguing against international interventions per se, so much as the illusions that 
increasingly seem to surround them. However well-intentioned the present international 
intervention in Sierra Leone may have been, and despite the undoubted benefits that have 
accrued, I remain convinced that interventions that are paternalistic, lacking in self-reflection 
and intolerant of ‘non-cosmopolitan’ peaceful forms of political expression are unlikely, in 
the medium- to long-term, to create the foundations for sustainable peace based on respect for 
human rights.  
 
 
Conclusion 
I have suggested that international humanitarian and human rights organisations should adopt 
their own versions of a sophisticated and self-reflexive political ‘anti-politics’. They should 
retain (or reclaim at all costs) their substantive independence from the governmental and 
intergovernmental agencies of the emerging imperial project. I believe that these steps are 
essential preconditions for the long-term credibility and legitimacy of the international human 
rights movement. But this is all very abstract and complex to operationalise in everyday life 
and work. How can it be understood and put into practice at this level? For my own purposes, 
I have developed the paradoxical operational concept of ‘strategic naivety’. I have found this 
 19
concept very useful on an individual basis in making the greatest sense possible of my own 
human rights activities over the past decade.  
 
My paradoxical operational concept of ‘strategic naivety’ requires the following: 
 
• Even if you act publicly as if moral condemnation and immediate political action will 
be enough to bring about the change you are calling for, recognise that the realisation 
of moral imperatives requires effective strategies that are based on how the world is, 
rather than simply how it ‘ought’ to be. On this basis, you can avoid becoming an 
adjunct to other actor’s agendas; 
• While recognising the importance of good historical and political analysis in 
formulating your strategies, understand nonetheless that the full operationalisation of 
that analysis is not possible in the context of a human rights organisation. Only on the 
basis of such recognition will it be possible to maximise the impact of such analysis; 
• While declaiming your organisation to be utterly principled, recognise that your 
organisation has bureaucratic and political interests in its successful reproduction (as 
do all others). Only by doing so can you identify ways of reducing the extent to which 
your actions are driven by such interests;  
• While operating on the basis of impartiality, do everything to support wider social 
movements that can promote the progressive change to which you are (probably) 
committed. 
 
The last point is possibly the most contentious. I am not suggesting that the values that being 
promoted are simply opportunistic camouflage. In fact, I am saying the opposite. If you 
believe in the liberating potential of human rights, do not view them as representing the only 
way of seeing the world. Acknowledge that they can ultimately only be realised through a 
wider mobilisation from below as well as political action from above. As we have seen, the 
danger of falling for our own myths is that the international human rights movement will 
become part of the problem for humankind, as expressed in the ‘power/justice’ nexus, rather 
than part of the solution. For me, the solution lies in building a global movement for social 
justice rather than simply an elite-driven movement for global justice – and in reclaiming 
human rights for that cause. 
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